Conception Of Human Flourishing Research Articles

Let's Hear it from Them: An Interview‐Based Exploration of Male Teachers' Perceptions of Gender Imbalance in the English Language Teaching Profession

AbstractThe presence of gender disparities, marked by a shortage of male teachers, has been a longstanding concern within the TESOL profession. Drawing on the concept of human flourishing, which advocates for equality and respect beyond gender and social standing, this research seeks to challenge gender stereotyping in foreign language teaching. Guided by personal observations and the stories of three male English language teachers, this article seeks to answer how male ESL/EFL1 teachers perceive gender playing out in their careers. By examining their perezhivaniya, or lived experiences, the study contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the gender dynamics within TESOL, filling a critical gap in the existing literature and offering new insights into the subjective emotional experiences shaping the professional lives of male teachers in this field. The research demonstrates how the feminization of the ELT environment affects their sense of self‐worth and fulfillment and ultimately their commitment to stay in the profession.

Religion and Rehabilitation in Colombian and South African Prisons: A Human Flourishing Approach

This paper examines whether and how religion contributes to prisoner rehabilitation—conceptualized as a prosocial change in self-identity, existential belief, and character based on identity theories of criminal desistance, the “Good Lives Model” of offender rehabilitation, and the concept of human flourishing. For this study, we conducted a quasi-experimental study assessing a faith-based program, “The Prisoner's Journey” (TPJ). We hypothesized that participation in TPJ increased religiosity, which in turn contributed to rehabilitation, measured by identity transformation, a new sense of meaning and purpose in life, and virtue development. It was also hypothesized that prisoner rehabilitation enhanced emotional well-being and reduced the risk of interpersonal aggression. To test our hypotheses, we applied structural equation modeling to analyze data from 506 prisoners in Colombia and South Africa, who participated in pretest and posttest surveys. As hypothesized, we found that completion of TPJ increased religiosity, which in turn fostered motivation for identity change, the perception of meaning and purpose in life, and the virtues of forgiveness, accountability, and self-control. In addition, the increased perception of meaning and purpose in life and two virtues (forgiveness and self-control) decreased negative emotions and the risk of interpersonal aggression. The implications and limitations of our study are discussed.

Liminal Lunch: Disclosure and Discursion in the School Cafeteria

AbstractLiminal spaces operate as thresholds, as spaces “lodged between all … spaces defined and governed in any specific biocultural ecosystem.” While these spaces offer interesting prospects for study, liminal spaces in schools have received very little scholarly attention. In labeling and considering the school cafeteria in U.S. schools as a liminal space, a new way of exploring a liminal “consciousness and imagination” is open to scholars and practitioners. This in‐between space allows students opportunities for discursion and disclosure not generally accessible in classrooms. As anthropologists have maintained, liminal spaces afford individuals freer experiences and opportunities not encountered in more frequented, orderly spaces. Examining these possibilities increases our awareness of the liminality of the school cafeteria, and such an awareness can help students in shaping different conceptions of human flourishing.

How Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach Values the Environment: Extrinsically But as an End?

ABSTRACT How Nussbaum’s capabilities approach engages with non-human nature is a topic of growing interest, though such work tends to focus on Nussbaum’s proposal to expand her approach to conceive of the flourishing of non-human animals. Less explored but still worth investigating is how her approach, insofar as it applies to humans, relates to the environment. I consequently ask, what kind of value does Nussbaum’s approach, as a conception of human flourishing, ascribe to the natural environment? Though widely assumed to value the natural environment instrumentally, I argue that it is instead plausible, and perhaps even more in keeping with certain commitments of the approach, to see it as valuing the environment extrinsically but as an end. I focus on Nussbaum’s eighth capability, “Other Species,” which refers to living with concern for and in relation to the world of nature, and argue that the value attributed to the environment by this capability may be extrinsically located, but should not be assumed to only be instrumental. By using Christine Korsgaard’s work on distinguishing between different kinds of valuing, I suggest a new way to understand how Nussbaum’s approach values the environment that has not been defended at length before.

Can Human Flourishing Be Liberal?

The renewed interest in virtue ethics raises again a persistent question, namely, the relationship between the virtue ethics theory and liberalism as a political philosophy. Virtue ethicists focus on the good—i.e., human flourishing—and debate what constitutes that good. This focus creates a problem for liberals who are rights-oriented, which is the dominant form of contemporary liberalism.The recent and timely book by Menachem Mautner, Human Flourishing, Liberal Theory, and the Arts, reminds us, however, that liberalism comes in many stripes. There is no one liberalism. Rather, there are many liberalisms. I discuss three aspects of Mautner’s remarkable and important book: first, his conception of human flourishing and its relationship to liberalism; second, his argument that a liberal political order committed to human flourishing ought to promote the arts; and third, his argument that the liberalism of flourishing is better able than neutralist liberalism to compete with religion in providing what Mautner calls “Big Meaning.”

Proximate Common Goods in the Context of Pluralism

Brad Gregory's The Unintended Reformation bemoans the loss of the shared “institutionalized worldview” that was Christendom, claiming that the resulting hyperpluralism renders it impossible to adjudicate among competing conceptions of the good. Our contemporary moment is better seen, though, as postsecular rather than as individualist and subjectivist. It is a context within which many different communities (of sometimes overlapping and shifting membership) seek to articulate the public character of their faith and accompanying conceptions of human flourishing. In such a context, it becomes possible for contemporary Christians to shift their attention from resenting the fact that Christianity no longer provides the West a shared cultural background and teleology to a more productive task: that of identifying proximate common goods and constructing piecemeal shared practices in pursuit of those goods, even as Christians keep their sights on a comprehensive eschatological beyond.

Formal criteria for the concept of human flourishing: the first step in defending flourishing as an ideal aim of education

Human flourishing is the topic of an increasing number of books and articles in educational philosophy. Flourishing should be regarded as an ideal aim of education. If this is defended, the first step should be to elucidate what is meant by flourishing, and what exactly the concept entails. Listing formal criteria can facilitate reflection on the ideal of flourishing as an aim of education. We took Aristotelian eudaimonia as a prototype to construct two criteria for the concept of human flourishing: (1) human flourishing is regarded as intrinsically worthwhile and (2) flourishing means ‘actualisation of human potential’. The second criterion has three sub-criteria: (2a) flourishing is about a whole life, (2b) it is a ‘dynamic state’ and (2c) flourishing presupposes there being objective goods.

The Concept of Human Flourishing in Charles Taylor

This essay was written for people who are not yet familiar with A Secular Age and other publications by Charles Taylor, as well as for those who are already acquainted with his work. Here I attempt to summarize, introduce and reflect upon Taylor’s massive oeuvre, with particular attention to the specific and central topic of human flourishing. I have chosen this special theme because it is essential to comprehending Taylor’s definition of what a secular age is, and because it is also a vital component of the renewal of moral theology after the Second Vatican Council. Furthermore it is an important concept for Christian humanism and Christian secularity. This essay follows Charles Taylor on his intellectual journey, as he strives to guide both secular and Christian minds to a mutual comprehension of the other’s true intentions, as well as to uncover shared values and the common concern for the human predicament. The article concludes with a reflection on the ways in which Taylor’s arguments could be improved by theology. I consider this to be the unity and distinction of nature and grace, as well as virtue ethics examined from a first person perspective.

Zealotless Passion and Passionate Moderation: Osiatyński's Defense of Human Rights and Their Limits

Zealotless Passion and Passionate Moderation:Osiatyński's Defense of Human Rights and Their Limits Andrzej Rapaczynski, Daniel G. Ross Professor of Law (bio) Wiktor Osiatyński , Human Rights and Their Limits (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) 264 pages, ISBN 9780521125239. Human rights literature rarely engenders complete consensus regarding either its content or its critiques. There may be some people who claim that genocide is good, basic education bad, and torture a desirable thing to engage in or be subjected to. Moreover, while some people are averse to the "rights talk," most would also agree that a regime that [End Page 1057] wantonly ignores people's basic interests, such as life, bodily integrity, freedom of speech and religion, education, and a modicum of material goods necessary for a minimally dignified life, is doing something wrong. It is when one tries to move beyond those truisms that the difficulties begin. On a philosophical level, many are not satisfied with a simple recognition of some respect due to the basic human interests, and attempt to "ground" them in a more general theory. People's basic interests have to be respected because humans are "rational beings," or because they have "inherent dignity," or because they are made in the image of God. The problem with these attempts is that the theories in which human rights are supposed to be grounded are significantly more controversial than the rights themselves—indeed, many proponents of the more philosophical theories seem to be driven to them in the first place because of the relative self-evidence of the rights that are supposed to flow from them, rather than the other way around. As a result, the philosophical theories of human rights tend to be somewhat second rate and not very interesting. On a more pragmatic level, the idea of human rights raises a host of pressing questions concerning their relation to other desirable goals of political and social life, such as democracy (majority rule), the need for domestic and international security, and economic prosperity. In this area, many advocates of human rights are perhaps the most disappointing. To be sure, many tyrants intent on oppressing their political, religious, or economic enemies clothe their call for ignoring the rights of their opponents in fraudulent theories of the cultural relativity of human rights, their alien character to non-Western cultures, and their role in imposing a culturally dominant point of view. It is also true that respect for basic human rights is probably most often conducive to economic growth, and its conflict with the demands of security if often exaggerated, especially in times of political hysteria. Nevertheless, human rights are clearly not the only value we hold dear, and it is simply disingenuous to claim that they can never come into a real conflict with other values or that, in cases of such conflicts, they should always be given a priority. When the commitment to human rights is not tempered by a sensitivity to the importance of other values, such as democracy, economic prosperity, or collective identity, the very concept of human rights tends to expand, gradually including all kinds of essentially political objectives that this or that group of proponents happens to espouse. Leaving behind the condemnation of relatively uncontroversial wrongs, human rights then extend to a panoply of economic and labor rights that many countries cannot afford, advanced environmental protection that needs in reality to be weighed against other social objectives, or an essentially unlimited, and often doctrinaire, concept of human flourishing that leaves no room for hard social and political choices reserved for each individual community. Indeed, as with all views, human rights rhetoric can also be abused and, consciously or unconsciously, serve as a cover for self-interested aims, such as economic protectionism. So a nuanced view is important—something that human rights advocates are tempted to ignore, and to adopt instead a rather self-righteous stand which denies that serious compromises may be necessary. Those who believe that such compromises may be called for are often seen as ill-intentioned, insensitive to moral values, and disparaging of human dignity. [End Page 1058] All this makes Wiktor Osiatyński's book, Human Rights and Their Limits...

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Contemporary Virtue Ethics

This guide accompanies the following article: Karen Stohr. ‘Contemporary Virtue Ethics’, Philosophy Compass 1/1 (January 2006): 22–7, doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2006.00004.xAuthor’s IntroductionVirtue ethics is now well established as a substantive, independent normative theory. It was not always so. The revival of virtue ethics was initially spurred by influential criticisms of other normative theories, especially those made by Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, John McDowell, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Bernard Williams.1 Because of this heritage, virtue ethics is often associated with anti‐theory movements in ethics and more recently, moral particularism. There are, however, quite a few different approaches to ethics that can reasonably claim to be versions of virtue ethics. The predominant strand of virtue ethics is broadly Aristotelian, although some accounts bear little resemblance to Aristotle’s. In its most general form, virtue ethics is compatible with a wide range of meta‐ethical and normative commitments. This diversity makes it difficult to compare virtue ethics as such with other normative theories. It can also be a challenge to see just what the various versions of virtue ethics have in common with each other.Three major types of virtue ethics are represented in the books by Rosalind Hursthouse, Michael Slote, and Christine Swanton, recommended in the following section. Each of these book sets forward a considerably self‐standing form of virtue ethics. The authors differ on central issues such as the relationship between virtue and flourishing and the link between virtuous agents and right or virtuous actions. Unlike Swanton and Slote, Hursthouse defends a version of ethical naturalism that has affinities with theories recently defended by Philippa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre.2 Slote’s theory is agent‐based, meaning that his account derives judgments about the moral status of actions from moral features of agents. Hursthouse and Swanton defend theories according to which the moral status of an action depends on its broader relationship to human flourishing (Hursthouse) or whether it hits the target of a virtue (Swanton).Although these three books presently form the core of contemporary virtue ethics, there are other approaches that might reasonably be described as versions of virtue ethics, such as those presented by Julia Driver, Linda Zagzebski, and Robert Adams.3 There are also, of course, a large number of articles in which authors defend or criticize tenets that are central to most versions of virtue ethics. Some recent articles on especially important topics are listed in the following section.Current ‘hot topics’ in virtue ethics include whether its account of right action is adequate and whether virtue ethics is at odds with empirical psychology. Articles on these debates and others are listed in the following section.Author Recommends:BooksThese three books are foundational works in contemporary virtue ethics, and represent quite different approaches to virtue ethics. For each book, I have also listed an article by the same author in which he or she articulates some similar themes. Those pressed for time or space on a syllabus might start by examining those articles. 1. Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Hursthouse defends a eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics with Aristotelian affinities. *See also Hursthouse, Rosalind. ‘Normative Virtue Ethics.’How Should One Live? Ed. Roger Crisp. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. 19–36. 2. Slote, Michael. Morals from Motives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Slote defends a version of virtue ethics based on evaluations of motives, drawing on historical figures like Martineau, Hutcheson, and Hume. Note that this book represents a fairly significant departure from his first book in virtue ethics, From Morality to Virtue (New York: Oxford, 1992). *See also Slote, Michael. ‘Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics.’Virtue Ethics. Ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 3. Swanton, Christine. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.Swanton defends a pluralistic, non‐eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics that draws on influences ranging from Aristotle to Nietzsche to contemporary psychoanalytic theory. *See also Swanton, Christine. ‘A Virtue Ethical Account of Right Action.’Ethics 112 (2001): 32–52.ArticlesThe following is a selection of articles that address some of the central and controversial topics within virtue ethics. 1. Annas, Julia. ‘Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing.’Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78.2 (2004): 61–75. This article addresses the problem of action guidance and the role that an account of right action should play in virtue ethics. 2. Conly, Sarah. ‘Flourishing and the Failure of the Ethics of Virtue.’Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. XIII, Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue. Eds. P. French et al. SouthBend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. 83–96. This article articulates the central problems faced by versions of virtue ethics that rely on a conception of human flourishing. 3. Das, Ramon. ‘Virtue Ethics and Right Action.’Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 324–39. This article raises objections about insularity and circularity to accounts of right action presented by Hursthouse, Slote, and Swanton. 4. Doris, John M. ‘Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics.’Nous 32 (1998): 504–30. This article argues that situationist psychology undermines the concept of a character trait on which virtue ethicists rely. An expanded version of this criticism can be found in Doris, Lack of Character, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 5. Hursthouse, Rosalind. ‘Virtue Theory and Abortion.’Philosophy and Public Affairs 20.3 (1991): 223–46. This article argues that virtue ethics is capable of providing action guidance in the difficult problem of abortion. 6. Johnson, Robert N. ‘Virtue and Right.’Ethics 113 (2003): 810–34. This article raises several objections against the accounts of right action in virtue ethics, one of which is that they cannot make sense of the rightness of self‐improving actions. The criticism is directly primarily at Hursthouse’s theory, but Swanton and Slote are discussed as well. 7. Kamtekar, Rachana. ‘Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character.’Ethics 114 (2004): 458–91. This article argues that situationist critiques of virtue ethics rely on a mistaken understanding of virtuous character. 8. Kawall, Jason. ‘Virtue Theory and Ideal Observers.’Philosophical Studies 109 (2002): 197– 222. This article argues for an ideal observer‐style account of right action in virtue ethics. 9. Nussbaum, Martha. ‘Non‐Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach.’Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XIII, Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue. Ed. P. French et al. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. 32–53. This article presents a view of the virtues on which the virtues are excellences in spheres of activity. Although the spheres are common to all humans, the manifestation of excellence in a given sphere is subject to cultural variation.10. Sreenivasan, Gopal. ‘Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution.’Mind 111 (2002): 47–68. This article addresses the situationist critique of character traits by arguing that virtue ethics does not depend on the concept of a character trait as Doris and others understand it.11. Stangl, Rebecca. ‘A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics.’Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008): 665–78. This article addresses the relationship between virtue ethics and radical moral particularism, arguing that the latter may have undesirable consequences for virtue ethicists unless they accept the unity of the virtues.12. Stohr, Karen. ‘Contemporary Virtue Ethics.’Philosophy Compass 1.1 (January 2006): 22–7. This article provides an overview and analysis of contemporary virtue ethics. It includes discussion of main problems and challenges for the future.13. Stohr, Karen. ‘Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue.’Journal of Ethics 7 (2003): 339–63. This article raises problems for the commonly accepted distinction between virtue and continence, arguing that the mixed emotions normally associated with continence are sometimes characteristic of virtue instead.14. van Zyl, Liezl. ‘Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Action Guidance.’Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2009): 50–69. This article defends agent‐based virtue ethics against objections that it cannot distinguish agent‐appraisal from act‐appraisal and that it cannot provide adequate action guidance.Anthologies1. Crisp, Roger, ed. How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. This is one of the first virtue ethics anthologies published, and so reflects a correspondingly earlier picture of the field. The essays, however, are important and interesting in their own right, and cover a broad array of topics.2. Crisp, Roger and Michael Slote, eds. Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. This anthology was published over a decade ago and does not capture recent developments in the field. It is, however, an admirably thorough collection of the most influential essays from the early days of virtue ethics, both promoting and criticizing it.3. Darwall, Stephen, ed. Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003. This anthology is distinctive in that it includes material from Aristotle, Hutcheson, and Hume, along with some central contemporary sources.4. Walker, Rebecca L. and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds. Working Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. This recent anthology focuses on applied virtue ethics and has an excellent selection of essays by influential thinkers on topics including the environment, business, medicine, war, and poverty.Online Sources‘Virtue Ethics’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics‐virtue/ Entry written by Rosalind Hursthouse and updated in 2007.‘Bibliography on Virtue Ethics’, maintained by Jörg Schroth. http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/cvirtue.pdf Extensive list of work published in virtue ethics. Updated regularly, listed in both alphabetical and chronological order, and contains abstracts of papers.‘Janusblog’, maintained by Guy Axtell. http://janusblog.squarespace.com/ Blog devoted to current work in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, although with an emphasis on the latter. It contains spirited discussion among the many contributors, as well as a library of papers.Sample SyllabusThis syllabus is for a graduate seminar or intense upper‐level undergraduate course. Books for purchase for this course might include the Crisp and Slote anthology, the Walker and Ivanhoe anthology, and Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics. Week 1: The Roots of Contemporary Virtue Ethics Anscombe, Elizabeth. ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (Crisp and Slote)Foot, Philippa. ‘Virtues and Vices’ (Crisp and Slote)MacIntyre, Alasdair. ‘The Nature of the Virtues’ (Crisp and Slote) Week 2: The Roots of Contemporary Virtue Ethics Stocker, Michael. ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories’ (Crisp and Slote)Williams, Bernard. ‘Morality, the Peculiar Institution’ (Crisp and Slote)McDowell, John. ‘Virtue and Reason’ (Crisp and Slote) Week 3: Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics, Part IHursthouse, Rosalind. ‘Practical Wisdom: A Mundane Account.’Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106.3 (2006): 283–307.Stangl, Rebecca. ‘A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics’ Week 4: Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics, Part IIStark, Susan. ‘Virtue and Emotion.’Nous 33.5 (2001): 440–55.Stohr, Karen. ‘Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue’ Week 5: Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics, Part IIIConly, Sarah. ‘Flourishing and the Failure of an Ethics of Virtue’Nussbaum, Martha. ‘Non‐Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach’MacIntyre, Alasdair. Dependent Rational Animals, chapter 10 Week 6: Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics Slote, Michael ‘Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics’ (Crisp and Slote)Slote, Michael, Morals from Motives, chapters 1 and 3 Week 7: Pluralistic Virtue Ethics Swanton, Christine. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, chapters 3, 4, and 11. Week 8: The Situationist Critique of Virtue Ethics Doris, John. ‘Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics’Kamtekar, Rachana. ‘Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character’Sreenivasan, Gopal. ‘Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution’Merritt, Maria. ‘Aristotelian Virtue and the Interpersonal Aspect of Ethical Character.’Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2009): 23–49. Week 11: Right Action – Problems Johnson, Robert. ‘Virtue and Right’Das, Ramon. ‘Virtue Ethics and Right Action’ Week 12: Right Action – Virtue Ethics Solutions Annas, Julia. ‘Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing’van Zyl, Liezl. ‘Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Action Guidance’Kawall, Jason. ‘Virtue Theory and Ideal Observers’ Week 13: Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles Pelligrino, Edmund. ‘Professing Medicine, Virtue Based Ethics, and the Retrieval of Professionalism’ (Walker and Ivanhoe)Swanton, Christine. ‘Virtue Ethics, Role Ethics, and Business Ethics’ (Walker and Ivanhoe)Sherman, Nancy. ‘Virtue and a Warrier’s Anger’ (Walker and Ivanhoe) Week 14: Virtue Ethics and the Non‐Human World Hursthouse, Rosalind. ‘Environmental Virtue Ethics’ (Walker and Ivanhoe)Walker, Rebecca. ‘The Good Life for Non‐Human Animals: What Virtue Requires of Humans’ (Walker and Ivanhoe)Focus Questions  What is the relationship between virtue and flourishing? Are the virtues necessary for flourishing? Sufficient?  Can virtue ethics provide an adequate account of right action?  On what concept of a character trait does virtue ethics rely, and does situationist psychology undermine it?  Is the project of ethical naturalism a plausible one? To what extent does the success of Aristotelian virtue ethics depend on it?  How does virtue ethics affect the way that applied ethics is done?

THE IMPORTANCE OF METAPHYSICAL REALISM FOR ETHICAL KNOWLEDGE

In this essay, I consider whether the alleged demise of metaphysical realism does actually provide a better way for defending the cognitive status of ethical judgments. I argue that the rejection of a realist ontology and epistemology does not help to establish the claim that ethical knowledge is possible. More specifically, I argue that Hilary Putnam's argument does not succeed in making a case for ethical knowledge. In fact, his account of the procedures by which our valuations are warranted—the criteria of idealized inquiry—ultimately begs the question in a number of crucial ways. Moreover, it prejudices the moral and political discussion in certain ideological respects. Finally, though Putnam has apparently modified to some extent his approach to the issue of realism in recent years, I will point out that these modifications are not fundamental and do not help to advance the case for ethical knowledge. I note also that Martha C. Nussbaum's appeal to Putnam’s argument actually works against her attempt to make a case for an Aristotelian conception of human flourishing. Ultimately, I conclude that metaphysical realism is vital for ethical knowledge.

Public provision of environmental goods: Neutrality or sustainability? a reply to david miller

Theorists of liberal neutrality, including in this context David Miller, claim that it is unjust for environmental policy to privilege a particular conception of the good by appealing to normative principles derived from any substantive conception of human flourishing. However, analysis of Miller's arguments reveals the inability of procedural justice thus understood to adequately engage with the complex and contested issue of the relationship between human beings and the rest of the world. Miller's attempt to distinguish categories of public goods generally, and environmental goods in particular, according to the possibility of reasonable disagreement, is seriously flawed. It results in an inability to distinguish between want-regarding and ideal-regarding justifications for the public provision of environmental goods, and more generally, an inability to recognise ecological sustainability as an important aspect of the common good. Effective environmental policy is not rendered illegitimate or unjust by incompatibility with liberal neutrality.

A moral ontology for a theistic ethic: gathering the nations in love and justice

This work develops a moral ontology for a theistic ethic that engages the work of contemporary moral and political philosophers, and reaffirms the relevance of a theistic tradition of God's relation to the world reflected in the fundamental teachings of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Drawing on recent thought in the non-religious fields of psychology and political and moral philosophy, which build around the concept of human flourishing in community, Kirkpatrick argues that a theistic ethic need not be the captive of parochial or sectarian theological camps. He proposes a common or universal ethic that transcends the fashionable ethnocentric incommensurate differences in morality alleged by many post-modern deconstructionists. In the wake of ethnic religious strife post September 11th 2001, this book argues for a common morality built on the inclusivity of love, community, and justice that can transcend sectarian and parochial boundaries.

Towards a Perfectionist Response to Ethical Conflict

This paper argues for a pluralist perfectionist response to ethical conflict. This sets for states and their public schools the task of helping people adjudicate conflicts between ethical orientations and of promoting or discouraging particular conceptions of a good life. The aim of deliberation is mutual ethical recognition and growth, judged against a thick yet universally shared conception of human flourishing. The political justification of perfectionism is that it provides a better defense against repression and discrimination than state neutrality on issues of the good life. The paper addresses liberal concerns and counters claims that adjudication threatens human relationships.

Ecocentrism and Persons

Ecocentrism has to establish an intrinsic connection between its basic value postulate of the non-instrumental value of the nonhuman world and a conception of human flourishing, on pain of failure to motivate acceptance of its social and political prescriptions. This paper explores some ideas recently canvassed by ecocentrists such as Robyn Eckersley, designed to establish this connection – transpersonal ecology, autopoietic value theory and ecofeminism – and finds them open to objection. An alternative approach is developed which concentrates on the connection between non-human nature and person-hood, via the phenomenon of culture. Persons are conceived of as essentially culture-creators, and the fact of their embodiment in ecosystems is argued to be essential to their activities as culture creators. The variety and integrity of such systems thus turns out to be essential for the flourishing of what is essential to personhood. This means that ecocentrism has to be abandoned in its pure form, and replaced with person-centrism, but this conclusion is argued for on the basis of the extension of the concept of the self – a strategy often endorsed by ecocentrists themselves.

Ecocentrism and Persons

Ecocentrism has to establish an intrinsic connection between its basic value postulate of the non-instrumental value of the nonhuman world and a conception of human flourishing, on pain of failure to motivate acceptance of its social and political prescriptions. This paper explores some ideas recently canvassed by ecocentrists such as Robyn Eckersley, designed to establish this connection – transpersonal ecology, autopoietic value theory and ecofeminism – and finds them open to objection. An alternative approach is developed which concentrates on the connection between non-human nature and person-hood, via the phenomenon of culture. Persons are conceived of as essentially culture-creators, and the fact of their embodiment in ecosystems is argued to be essential to their activities as culture creators. The variety and integrity of such systems thus turns out to be essential for the flourishing of what is essential to personhood. This means that ecocentrism has to be abandoned in its pure form, and replaced with person-centrism, but this conclusion is argued for on the basis of the extension of the concept of the self – a strategy often endorsed by ecocentrists themselves.

Virtue and the practice of modern medicine.

Robert Veatch has claimed that virtue theory is not only irrelevant but potentially dangerous in medical ethics. I argue that virtue is a far more prominent factor in contemporary medical practice than Veatch admits. Even if 'stranger medicine' is taken as the norm, proper conduct on the part of physicians depends on certain character traits in order to be maintained consistently over a long period of time and in situations which run counter to the physician's own interests. Right conduct, which Veatch argues is the central moral issue in the physician-patient relationship, is intertwined with certain virtues. Moreover, the virtue of integrity and the concept of a unified life-narrative are especially useful in analyzing an important factor missing in modern medicine. And since medicine relies necessarily on some concept of human flourishing I argue that virtue theory can play a central role in helping to determine the goals of medical practice.